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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by §78-2a-3(j), U.C.A. This is an 
appeal from a final judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed 
May 23, 1990. On July 31, 1990, this case was transferred to the Court of 
Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-2(4), U.C.A. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS, FABIAN AND CLENDENIN, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE OF THEIR FORMER 
REPRESENTATION OF MARGETTS AND HIS FAMILY AND 
BUSINESS ENTITIES. 
POINT II 
THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT WAS A PART OF MARGETTS' 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE A CONDOMINIUM AND TO RELEASE 
HIS TRUST DEED AND MUST BE CONSTRUED AS AN ESSENTIAL 
PART OF THAT TOTAL AGREEMENT. 
POINT III 
NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT 
BECAUSE OF THE ACTS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE 
ATTORNEY WHO HAD ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO 
ACT FOR ITS PREDECESSOR AND BECAUSE IT HAS RATIFIED THE 
AGREEMENT AND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE AGREEMENT BY 
ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS THEREOF. 
POINT IV 
NEW WEST, AS THE SUCCESSOR, IN INTEREST TO TERRACE 
FALLS BY DEED WITHOUT A FORECLOSURE AND BY ITS 
PREDECESSOR'S CONTRACT WITH TERRACE FALLS IS BOUND 
BY THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS WITH MARGETTS TO 
GIVE HIM CREDIT AGAINST THE PRICE FOR HIS CONDOMINIUM 
FOR SALES OF OTHER CONDOMINIUMS IN THE PROJECT. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued: 
POINT V 
MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE AGREEMENTS 
WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN BY IMPROPER 
CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION, 
MISTAKE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCION-
ABILITY, OR UNFAIR DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION 
OR DAMAGES. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR RENTAL 
VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100 WAS 
UNSUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS CONTFIARY TO 
LAW. 
POINT VII 
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600 IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW AND MUST BE 
REVERSED. 
POINT VIII 
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE OVERTURNED 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY STATUTE OR AGREEMENT. 
POINT IX 
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS CONTRARY TO 
LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE CALCULATED 
PRECISELY AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE. 
-w-
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The issue of disqualification of attorneys involves mixed questions of 
fact and law which does not require deference to the findings of the lower 
court. The standard of review of the disqualification issue has been held to 
be the abuse of discretion standard, Maraulies v. Uochurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (Utah 1985), but some courts review disqualification without deference 
to the trial court because the ethical rules governing the legal profession 
involve substantial legal questions. Unified Sewaraae Aaencv v. Jelco Inc.. 
646 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) 
2. The issue of construing several agreements together as one 
transaction is a question of law and no deference to the trial court is 
required. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 
1357, 1358 (UtahApp. 1987). 
3. The remaining issues involve mixed questions of fact and law which 
"do not require the deference due to findings on questions of pure fact." 
Maraulies v. Upchurch. supra, at 1200. However, to the extent that findings 
of fact had to be made to determine the facts of agency (Point III) fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake, unconscionability (Point V), 
the existence of a rental agreement (Point VI), benefits conferred (Point VI), 
and reasonableness of attorney's fees (Point VIII), the lower court's findings 
are to be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support them. But, the 
legal conclusions resulting from the facts and the interpretations of the 
agreements and of the statutes are questions of law which are reviewed only 
for correctness with no deference to the lower court's determination. 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 
(Utah 1988); Asay v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Nielson v. 
Nielson. 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989). In particular, the issues of 
whether New West is jointly bound with Terrace Falls (Point II), bound by the 
acts of its agent (Point III), bound as the successor of Terrace Falls (Point IV), 
or bound by ratification and estoppel (Point III), whether the facts found 
constitute fraud, negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake, 
unconscionability (Point V), and interpretation of or compliance with any 
agreement, rule or statute (Points I, II, III, IV, VII and VIII) are all questions of 
law to be reviewed for correctness only. In addition, the issues of 
prejudgment interest (Point IX), attorney's fees (Point VIII), and whether it is 
inequitable to retain benefits conferred (Point VI) are for the court to decide 
and are not trier-of-fact questions. They are to be reviewed for correctness 
only. 
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for 
which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by 
express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated 
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly 
or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the 
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, 
or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of 
that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, 
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which 
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when 
he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when 
he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and 
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, 
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served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three 
days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person 
interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and 
conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be 
performed, then no notice need be given. 
§78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the 
tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his lace of residence or from his usual place of 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of 
residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of 
residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased 
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner. 
§78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate 
enforcement - Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A 
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the 
restitution of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of 
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
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(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after 
default in the payment of rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for 
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a) 
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in 
the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of 
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
immediately. 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually 
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the 
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after 
consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of 
the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or 
when the information has become generally known. 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly 
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so by Rule 1.7,1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may no 
knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially factually related 
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer has associated, 
had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to 
that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected 
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
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(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially 
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer 
unless: 
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 
1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected 
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
-xi-
IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, successor-in-
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN L MARGETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900409-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff New West Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
referred to as "New West") filed a Complaint against defendant John L 
Margetts (hereinafter referred to as "Margetts") to enforce an agreement to 
buy a condominium unit from New West or, in the alternative, to obtain 
possession of the property and a judgment for the rental value of the property. 
Margetts' Answer asserted that he was coerced into signing the purchase 
agreement by fraud and duress and the simultaneous signing of another 
agreement which would have given him credit for the full amount of the 
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purchase price for the condominium unit and also into giving up a trust deed 
lien against the whole condominium project. He counterclaimed for a deed to 
the unit, for offsets for expenses paid to complete the unit, for the value of 
sales of other units made by Margetts for New West and for the value of 
Margetts' security services in the project. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
After trial the lower court entered judgment in favor of New West in the 
amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble 
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of 
Margetts in the condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement 
with Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West, 
by which Margetts agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a 
condominium in what later became known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at 
Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City. Because the Terrace Falls 
Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust Deed on 
the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the 
completed condominium. 
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded 
Margetts to enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition 
Agreement, with Terrace Falls Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new 
name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by which Margetts would receive 
credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit in the project 
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of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the 
date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the 
project to construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts 
was recorded December 22, 1981 (Exh.3). 
3. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margett's 
attorney, requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings 
& Loan Association, the construction lender on the Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, on September 12,1984 (R.539, p.292). This was followed by 
a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request 
(Exh.5). 
4. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens of 
American Savings and Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums 
and its principals were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was 
going to foreclose its first trust deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums 
and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein unless it could obtain a release of all 
junior liens against the project, including Margetts' trust deed. Mr. Snow and 
Mr. Stevens then offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his trust 
deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the 
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit 
of $150,000.00 towards the purchase of a condominium (R.539, pp.203-4; 
R.538, pp.61-63). 
5. Mr. Snow prepared and delivered several agreements 
(Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General 
Release, and Request for Reconveyance), giving Margetts the $150,000.00 
credit and made several requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next 
-3-
two months that the agreements be signed and returned because all other 
lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up the whole settlement 
(R.539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R.538, p.135). Margetts refused to do so. 
6. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was 
anxious to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting 
with margetts, without his attorney, on November 14, 1984. Mr. Margetts 
again refused to sign the agreements (R.538, pp. 125-6; R.539, p.210). Mr. 
Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr. Snow thought he 
could present a better deal to him (R.539, p.211). 
7. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he 
was presented with an additional agreement (Exh.10 and 16) which would 
give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated 
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the 
condominium project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously 
prepared Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, 
General Release, and Request For Reconveyance. Mr. Snow assured 
Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty 
percent agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound 
by that agreement. Mr. Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R.538, 
pp. 139-140; R.539, pp.212-214). He further told Margetts that he would get 
what he wanted by that agreement, that only seven condominiums had to be 
sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that American Savings did 
not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American would be 
Terrace Falls Condominiums. 
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8. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh.11) and 
Terrace Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-in-
lieu of foreclosure conveying the entire project to American and American 
took over the completion and operation of the project (Exh. 4). 
9. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the 
condominium unit to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain 
specified finish items had been completed in the unit, which would be no later 
than June 30,1985 (Exh.6, 1f6; Exh.7, 1f6). 
10. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not 
finish the unit as required by the agreement (Exh.22, 24-27). Margetts paid 
$9,234.00 of his own money to partially finish the unit (R.465, p.3) and he was 
told by American's attorney to move into the unit on August 25, 1985 even 
though American did not have a certificate of occupancy and could not deliver 
title to Margetts (R.539, p.226-8). 
11. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security 
personnel on the project relying on Margetts' presence in the project as 
security for the whole project (R.539, p.233). 
12. American did not form the owners association for the condominium 
project until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any 
assessments, taxes, or rent on the unit (R.539, pp.233-235). 
13. In reliance on the Twenty Percent Agreement signed as an 
inducement for Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement 
and other agreements, Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy 
condominium units in the project (R.539, p.230). 
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14. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and 
convey title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of 
units sold to purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items 
paid by Margetts. It also refused to allow him to select another unit as 
provided in the agreements. 
15. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to 
American, caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that 
he vacate the unit within five (5) days (R.538, p.178). 
16. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this 
action for unlawful detainer (R.2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim 
asserting that he was entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by 
fraud and deception to surrender his trust deed on the project and to pay an 
additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was entitled to a credit of 
$16,000.00 for finish items and further amounts for security services against 
the purchase price of his unit (R.27-51). 
17. Fabian and Clendenin, the attorneys for New West in this matter, 
represented Margetts and his family and business interests for 29 years prior 
to the transactions involved in this case, including some counsel with respect 
to the transaction to exchange condominiums which led to this lawsuit 
(R. 104-107). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED. 
The firm of attorneys representing New West represented Margetts for 29 
years and advised him on matters which eventually gave rise to this suit. 
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There is an irrebuttable presumption that confidential information was 
disclosed. The Rules of Professional Conduct and other ethical standards 
require that New West's attorneys be disqualified. Enforcement of such Rules 
and standards after the fact is only effective if the judgment resulting from the 
improper representation is reversed. 
II. ALL THE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT, WERE ONE TRANSACTION AND ONE AGREEMENT. 
New West has based this action on documents which Margetts refused 
to sign until he was presented with the Twenty Percent Agreement as 
incentive and inducement to sign the others. They were all signed at the 
same time and as a part of the same transaction and must be construed 
together as one agreement. That means that New West is jointly bound with 
Terrace Falls to perform the promises made to Margetts in return for the 
release of his lien. 
III. NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS 
CONDOMINIUMS. 
Besides being bound jointly with Terrace Falls to perform the promises 
made to Margetts, New West is also bound because those promises and 
representations were made by the agent of its predecessor, American 
Savings & Loan. That agent was placed in a position by American where 
Margetts was justified in assuming he was acting and speaking for American. 
That agent was the only person who dealt with Margetts and he was 
authorized by American to negotiate for it and to draft agreements for it. That 
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agent was also paid by American. American, and New West, have accepted 
the benefits obtained from Margetts and have ratified those acts and are 
estopped to deny their liability therefor. 
IV. NEW WEST IS BOUND, AS THE SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF 
TERRACE FALLS, TO HONOR THE AGREEMENT WITH MARGETrS. 
New West's predecessor purchased everything owned by Terrace Fails, 
leaving it with nothing. It purchased the name "Terrace Falls'1 and the 
business of selling condominiums. It agreed to pay any sums required to be 
paid to obtain the release from Margetts. It intentionally chose to step into 
American's shoes rather than foreclose and terminate Margetts' interest. It still 
does business as Terrace Falls Condominiums and is selling the units from 
which Margetts' unit was to be paid for. New West is obligated to perform the 
agreement with Margetts and honor the representations made to him by 
crediting him with twenty percent of the proceeds of the sale of other units. 
V. MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES. 
The representations made to Margetts induced him to give up his lien on 
the property. Therefore, if he does not receive the credit towards the 
purchase of his unit, he is entitled to rescission and reinstatement of his lien 
or damages for his loss on the grounds of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
duress, mistake, unconscionability or unfair dealing. 
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VI. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. 
The judgment for rent of $17,100.00 was not based on any kind of 
agreement, express or implied. The elements of unjust enrichment were not 
pleaded nor proved. Both parties benefited from Margetts' occupancy of the 
unit, New West more than Margetts. Besides saving the cost of security 
personnel which were dismissed because of Margetts1 presence, New West 
received the benefit of five sales of units, the buyers of which were referred by 
Margetts. It is not inequitable that Margetts retain any benefit he received. 
VII. THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER HAS NO BASIS IN 
LAW OR FACT. 
Strict compliance with the unlawful detainer statute is required in order to 
take advantage of the severe and summary remedies which it provides. New 
West failed to comply because there was no periodic tenancy and no 
conversion of that tenancy to a tenancy at will. The Notice to Quit was not 
served as required by the statute. New West also suffered no actual 
damages from Margetts' tenancy because Margetts1 wife was not served and 
was entitled to remain in possession. Nominal damages are the most that 
could be awarded. 
VIII. THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES HAS NO BASIS IN LAW 
OR FACT. 
There is no statute or agreement which provides for attorney's fees in this 
case. New West abandoned its claim under the purchase agreement and, 
therefore, cannot claim fees thereunder. The judgment was not based on the 
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agreement. There was also no evidence of or stipulation as to attorney's fees 
from which the court could make a determination of reasonableness. 
IX. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT ALLOWABLE. 
The prejudgment interest was calculated on what the court found to be 
the fair rental value of the property. That finding is the province of the trier-of-
fact from the testimony of experts and, therefore, could not have been 
determined at the time with mathematical certainty. Therefore, prejudgment 
interest may not be included in the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS, FABIAN AND CLENDENIN, 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE OF THEIR 
FORMER REPRESENTATION OF MARGETTS AND HIS 
FAMILY AND BUSINESS ENTITIES. 
Margetts, in his answer, raised the question of the conflict of interest 
presented by Fabian and Clendenin's representation of New West in this 
matter (R.31-2). Immediately thereafter, he filed a motion to disqualify them 
(R.97) supported by his affidavit (R.104-7) disclosing the fact that Fabian and 
Clendenin had performed work for and represented Margetts for 29 years for 
which he had paid them over $100,000.00 in legal fees. These services 
included numerous matters involving his business and personal matters, 
including setting up family trusts for his wife and children and advice on the 
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trade of his Park City Condominium for an interest in the Terrace Falls project 
involved in this case (R. 105-107, H6). All of these matters were extracted 
from his diary. This representation only terminated because of a conflict of 
interest over some of these matters. Understandably, Margetts was incensed 
when "his" law firm filed this suit against him. Despite his objections, Fabian 
and Clendenin has persisted in its actions against him and refused to 
withdraw based on the argument that none of the present attorneys in the firm 
performed services for him. 
Nevertheless, there is a larger principle involved. As stated in Maraulies 
v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), at 1204: 
Among the guidelines for professional conduct which we have 
approved is Canon 9, which states: "A lawyer should avoid even 
the appearance of professional impropriety." The basis of this 
tenet is that society's perception of the integrity of our legal 
system may be as important as the reality, since it is the 
perception that engenders public confidence that justice will be 
dispensed. 
One can imagine the perception Margetts or anyone associated with him has 
of our legal system when the law firm, which represented him for 29 years 
and to whom he paid over $100,000.00, sued him and the court allowed him 
to do it. That perception goes far beyond Margetts and his associates and 
family as this matter has become public. The Rules of Professional Conduct 
are designed to prevent this but 
the Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical 
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile 
human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The 
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Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. 
(Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble, 12, under "Scope") 
Yet, the Rules are fairly specific. Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would 
permit with respect to a client or when the information has 
become generally known. 
Rule 1.10 makes this Rule applicable to all lawyers in the firm when any one 
of them practicing alone would be prohibited from representing a client. Even 
the termination of a lawyer from the firm doesn't avoid the conflict in a matter 
that "is the same or substantially related" or if "any lawyer remaining in the 
firm has information" that is confidential or could be used to the client's 
disadvantage (Rule 1.10(c)). 
In this case, members of the firm advised Margetts on the very 
transaction which eventually resulted in this lawsuit. That makes this a matter 
which "is the same or substantially related." In addition, members of the firm 
may have, or files of the firm may contain, information about the assets of 
Margetts that could assist them in collecting any judgment against Margetts. 
Use of that information would be "to the disadvantage of the former client." 
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The firm not only knows and has records of his business interests but also 
prepared trusts for his wife and children to which assets were transferred. 
Although it is not a part of the record in this case, it is interesting that this 
same firm has now filed an action against Margetts' wife to recover from her 
the judgment entered in this case. How can it be known that that action was 
not taken as a result of knowledge concerning assets that were transferred to 
her pursuant to the estate planning done by members of the firm? No such 
accusation is being made but such a possibility exists and what does that do 
to "the appearance of professional impropriety"? 
Cases under Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its 
predecessors hold that 
the communication of confidential information is presumed once 
a showing is made that the matter in which an attorney formerly 
provided representation is substantially related to matters in the 
pending action. 
The majority rule is that the presumption of disclosure is not 
rebuttable when the interests of the previous client are adverse 
to a client whom the attorney now is representing. Carlson v. 
Lanadon. 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988) [a case in which the 
alleged but denied representation of the former client took place 
twelve years previously and involved documents now in 
litigation]. 
The Court will assume that during the course of the former 
representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney 
bearing on the subject matter of the representation. I will not 
inquire into their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the 
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the 
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rule relating to privileged communications be maintained. (T.C. 
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. Inc.. 113 F. Supp. 265, 
268-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
The attorneys in those cases, as well as in Maraulies v. Upchurch. supra. 
were disqualified. New West's attorneys in this case should also have been 
disqualified. The lower court's refusal to do so should be reversed and the 
entire judgment resulting from the inappropriate representation should be 
overturned. 
POINT II 
THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT WAS A PART 
OF MARGETTS' AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE A 
CONDOMINIUM AND TO RELEASE HIS TRUST DEED 
AND MUST BE CONSTRUED AS AN ESSENTIAL 
PART OF THAT TOTAL AGREEMENT. 
It is clear from the testimony of Margetts and Mr. Snow that Margetts 
would not have signed the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement 
Agreement, General Release and Request for Reconveyance if the Twenty 
Percent Agreement were not part of the total agreement. He had already 
refused to sign those other agreements several times including on the 
morning of November 14, 1984 when he met with Mr. Snow. On that 
occasion, Mr. Snow told him to come back later that day because "maybe 
there's a way that we can get you Condominium 413" (R.539, p.211). When 
Margetts returned Mr. Snow presented him with the Twenty Percent 
Agreement as an "incentive" (R.539, p.211) and explained to him that "they 
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only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid 
for" (R.539, p.212) and that Margetts would get what he wanted by such an 
agreement (R.539, p.213). Margetts was clearly induced to sign the other 
documents by the presentation of the Twenty Percent Agreement and would 
not have signed those documents without it (R.538, p.130, R.539, p.219). Mr. 
Snow even wrote on the Twenty Percent Agreement that the others would not 
be delivered unless the Twenty Percent Agreement was signed and delivered 
simultaneously (Exh.16, R.538, p.134). 
Under these circumstances the principle set forth in Bullfrog Marina Inc. 
v. Lentz. 28 U. 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270-271 (1972) applies: 
"[T]he trial court found that after full consideration of the entire 
transaction, including the purpose to be served by the lease and 
the employment contract, defendant would not have leased the 
boats to plaintiff, unless he could operate the houseboat rental 
service. The trial court concluded that the lease and 
employment contract bore a relationship to one another and 
should be considered as one agreement . . . . [W]here two or 
more instruments are executed by the same parties 
contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of the 
same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will 
be read and construed together so far as determining the 
respective rights and interests of the parties although they do not 
in terms refer to each other." 
See also Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 740 P.2d 1357 
(Utah 1987): Atlas Corp. v.. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); 
First Security Bank v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). Likewise the 
agreements to purchase the condominium and to release the trust deed 
would not have been signed without the Twenty Percent Agreement. They 
should be considered as one agreement. 
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POINT III 
NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY WHO HAD 
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR 
ITS PREDECESSOR AND BECAUSE IT HAS RATIFIED 
THE AGREEMENT AND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE 
AGREEMENT BY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE 
BENEFITS THEREOF. 
New West, of course, contends that it is not bound by the Twenty Percent 
Agreement because it was not signed by American Savings even though it 
has accepted and had the benefit of the consideration given by Margetts for 
that agreement. Margetts, of course, only knew what Mr. Snow was telling 
him so the question is whether he was justified in relying upon Mr. Snow. 
From the very beginning of these negotiations with American Savings Mr. 
Snow was its spokesman. At the first meeting with a representative of 
American it was Mr. Snow who did most of the talking (R.539, p.264), and it 
was Mr. Snow who made the offer to Margetts (R.539, p.265). It was clear that 
the offer was being made by American and that any deal would have to be 
made with American. It would be paying the money or conveying the unit 
being offered. After that meeting it was Mr. Snow who called to increase the 
offer and it was Mr. Snow who had all further contact with Margetts or his 
attorney right up to the signing of all of the documents by Margetts. It was Mr. 
Snow who drafted the documents presented to Margetts and who revised 
those documents at the request of Margetts. There was no question in 
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Margetts' mind that Mr. Snow was speaking for and representing American. 
This was especially true when Mr. Snow told him "they only have to sell seven 
condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" (R.539, p.212), that he 
would get what he wanted by such an agreement (R.539, p.213) and 
American doesn't need to sign the agreement because "with the deed-in-lieu 
of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" (R.539, p.214). 
What else could Margetts believe but that he represented and was speaking 
for American? 
By allowing Mr. Snow to speak for them, American placed Mr. Snow in a 
position of apparent, if not actual, authority to bind it. Mr. Lee Stevens, 
American's representative, appeared with Mr. Snow and allowed him to 
speak for him and to make and increase American's offer. American 
approved ail changes in the agreements and paid Mr. Snow's fees incurred in 
dealing with Margetts and others. These facts clearly establish Mr. Snow as 
an agent with authority to act for American. 
The principle of agency that governs here was stated in Kline v. Multi-
Media Cablevision. Inc.. 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), in which the 
court answered a question certified to it by a federal court as to when a 
corporation is liable for punitive damages for the wrongful acts of its agent. 
As a preliminary matter the court set forth these two well-established legal 
principles, at 713: 
First, a corporation is liable for the torts of its agent when 
committed within the scope of the agent's authority and course 
of employment even though it did not authorize or ratify the 
tortious acts Russell v. American Rock Crusher Co.. 181 Kan. 
891, 894, 317 P.2d 847 (1957). A related rule of law states a 
principal is responsible for the torts of its agent where the 
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tortious acts are incidental to and in furtherance of the principal's 
business, even though outside the scope of the agent's authority. 
Williams v. Community Drive-ln Theater. Inc.. 214 Kan. 359, 520 
P. 2d 1296 (1974). 
If those principles apply to the wrongful acts of the agent, they also apply 
to acts which are not wrongful but are performed to carry out the purposes of 
the corporation, as was the case here. See Ficke v. Alaska Airlines. Inc.. 524 
P.2d 271 (Alaska, 1974), where the court held that an attorney retained to 
negotiate the terms of an agreement binds his client to promises made within 
the scope of that authority although not authorized. And, even though New 
West now claims Mr.Snow had no authority to act for its predecessor, he was 
clearly authorized by American to prepare and obtain the signature of 
Margetts on the settlement agreements and it is bound by the acts of Mr. 
Snow which are "incidental to and in furtherance of that object "even though 
outside the scope of his authority. 
This principle has also been held to apply to the acts of an attorney who 
did not actually represent the party bound by those acts. In Arizona Title Ins. 
and Trust Co. v. Pace. 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), a title insurance 
company retained an attorney to defend its insured on a claim on which it had 
denied coverage. The attorney settled the claim for $4,750.00 which the 
insured paid. The insured then sued the title insurance company to recover 
the amount paid to settle. The question presented to the court was whether 
the insurance company was bound by the settlement entered into by the 
insured's attorney, who was hired and paid by the insurer. The court held, at 
473-4: 
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However, if the client places the attorney in a position where 
third persons of ordinary prudence and discretion would be 
justified in assuming the attorney was acting within his authority, 
then the client is bound by the acts of the attorney within the 
scope of his apparent authority . . . . 
. . . . The appellant retained an attorney who, although named as 
an attorney of record for the defendants-insured, was primarily 
involved in the litigation to protect the interests of the insurer. 
The attorney regularly advised the insurer, through its managing 
agent, of the progress of the litigation. The insurer was fully 
aware of the fact that the appellees construed Ellis's 
representation of them to be nominal only and that Ellis was 
acting for the insurer. Therefore, when Ellis advised 
compromise of the Bailey's claim and volunteered to effect it on 
behalf of the appellees, they were justified in assuming that he 
had authority to do so. Under such circumstances, appellant is 
estopped to assert otherwise and is thereby bound by the act of 
its attorney. 
Here we have a similar situation where Mr. Snow nominally represented 
Terrace Falls but was paid by, gave advice to and took direction from 
American. The only difference was that Margetts was on the other side of the 
matter and would be less likely to know of any lack of authority of Mr. Snow to 
act for American. Our case is, therefore, a stronger one for holding that Mr. 
Snow had apparent authority to act for American and that Margetts was 
justified in assuming he had authority. 
Utah cases also hold that a party, including the State, is bound by the 
acts of attorneys which it places in a position where others will rely on those 
acts. Goraoza. Inc. v. Utah State Road Commission. 553 P.2d 413 (1976), 
held that the State was bound by an agreement entered into by its attorney 
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which obligated the State to provide access to property which the State had 
not authorized. The court went on, at 415, to point out that the State 
proceeded to act pursuant to the agreement and in accordance 
with the benefit it received therefrom, so there is at least some 
plausibility to the idea that is should be deemed to have ratified 
and/or to be estopped from repudiating that contract. 
In a suit brought by the payee of a usurious promissory note against both 
the makers of the note and the attorney who was retained by the makers to 
draft the note, the court in Silver v. George. 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980), 
held the makers and the attorney liable for the damage caused in these 
words, at 1159: 
We hold that it is a per se violation of an attorney's duty for him to 
draw a note, which is on its face usurious, that that duty runs at 
least to the named parties to the note, including the payee, even 
though the payee did not hire him or pay his fee; that the 
attorney is the agent for his clients in drawing the note; and that 
his clients should not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the payee when the attorney draws a note which 
violates the law and thus confers a benefit upon his client at the 
expense of the relying and innocent payee. 
While the terms of the agreements themselves, in our case, did not 
violate the law, Margetts innocently relied upon the attorney hired by 
American to draft those agreements and it should not be permitted to be 
unjustly enriched at the expense of Margetts by taking advantage of the 
benefit conferred upon it by the actions and representations of that attorney. 
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That American was directly involved in the whole process through Mr. 
Snow and was well aware of the benefit it was to receive from the transaction 
with Margetts is clear from the testimony of Mr. Snow. He testified as follows: 
If it wasn't satisfactory to American, then the deal wouldn't go 
through; so I had to run the documents past American. (R.538, 
p.83) 
And then, in my sending documents back and forth to Roulhac 
Gam, it was clarified what documents were needed and what 
the form of those documents would have to be. 
Q. But, did you talk to Roulhac Garn about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did she indicate they were mandatory, that those 
documents be signed by Jack Margetts? 
A. She indicated that it was mandatory that Jack Margetts, 
along with all the other lienholders, reconvey their interest in the 
project. (R.538, pp.102-3) 
Q. That intent was communicated to you by someone at 
American? 
A. Yes. (R.538, p. 113) 
. . . did American at any time inform you that they were willing 
to pay your fee in part because the work that you were doing 
was of substantial benefit to American? 
A. Yes. (R.5, p.117) 
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Q. So, when you drafted it, revised it, prepared it, negotiated 
about it [referring to Exhibit 7], that was solely for American 
Savings, is that correct? 
A. Yes. (R.538, p.123) 
Question: [Referring to the Twenty Percent Agreemenl] 
After preparing this, did you discuss this agreement with 
American? 
Answer: Probably. 
A. Yes. As far as it goes in context, yes. 
Q. Is that what you said? 
A. Yes. (R.538, p. 133) 
Even Rouihac Gam, the San Francisco attorney for American, who 
disingenuously denied that Mr. Snow was American's Salt Lake attorney, 
admitted the benefit to American of Mr. Snow's work. Her testimony was: 
Q. Did it prove, also, of value to American Savings? 
A. I don't know. The transaction wouldn't have closed 
without these agreements. 
Q. It was vital then, was it not, that all of these documents be 
signed? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And they were all required by the deed-in-lieu agreement 
that you prepared? 
A. Yes. (R.539, p.311) 
American wanted to obtain a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and a release of all 
liens against the property. It paid Mr. Snow to accomplish that. Mr. Snow 
succeeded in accomplishing that only by making representations to Margetts 
which induced him to sign the agreements and release his lien against the 
property. American received the benefit of that release. New West, as 
American's successor, has accepted that benefit but now refuses to recognize 
the representations made by the agent who obtained that benefit. If the 
principles of actual or apparent authority do not bind New West to those 
representations, then the principles of ratification and estoppel by acceptance 
of the benefits obtained by those representations do bind New West. 
POINT IV 
NEW WEST, AS THE SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO 
TERRACE FALLS BY DEED WITHOUT A 
FORECLOSURE AND BY ITS PREDECESSOR'S 
CONTRACT WITH TERRACE FALLS, IS BOUND BY 
THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS WITH 
MARGETTS TO GIVE HIM CREDIT AGAINST THE 
PRICE FOR HIS CONDOMINIUM FOR SALES OF 
OTHER CONDOMINIUMS IN THE PROJECT. 
New West has suggested that the purpose of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement was to allow Margetts to participate in any windfall or kickback 
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that might be paid to Terrace Falls after the deed-in-lieu to American. This 
suggestion makes no sense since Terrace Falls was conveying its entire 
interest in the project and retained no rights to receive anything back from 
American. And, of course, anything that went to Terrace Falls in the form of a 
kickback would not be made known to Margetts. There was no reason for him 
to expect anything from Terrace Falls. The Twenty Percent Agreement was 
totally valueless if the credit to Margetts under the Agreement was to come 
from Terrace Falls, the partnership which owned the project prior to its 
conveyance to American. It would not be selling any condominium units nor 
would it receive anything from the sale of condominium units. If that were the 
purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement it would be totally illusory and 
Margetts surely would not have released his lien and signed the other 
agreements in return for such an illusory expectation. Nor would American 
expect him to do so, knowing of his refusal for two months to accept what they 
had already proposed. In other words, it was totally unreasonable for both 
parties to interpret the Twenty Percent Agreement to give Margetts a 
percentage of what Terrace Falls might get in the future, which everybody 
knew would be nothing. Margetts would not give up his bargaining position 
for nothing and American knew he would not. 
Furthermore, why would the assignment to Margetts be limited to 
$134,283.00, the price to be paid by Margetts under the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement with American (Exh.7), if that agreement was not part of 
the whole transaction with American. There would be no reason to limit his 
participation with Terrace Falls to that figure. 
•24-
Therefore, the only interpretation of the Twenty Percent Agreement that 
makes any sense is that it was American who was agreeing to credit 
Margetts, up to $134,283.00, the stated purchase price of his unit, for 20% of 
"any proceeds from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein" 
(Exhs. 10 and 16). For this reason Margetts' testimony as to what Mr. Snow 
told him about the agreement is entirely credible and the only version of the 
conversation that is credible: 
Q. After Mr. Snow had presented you with the 20-Percent 
Agreement, Exhibit 16, did he say anything to you? 
A. Yes. He said, "Do you realize that they only have to sell 
seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for?" 
Q. Did you make any response to that? 
A. He made an explanation that I would get what I wanted by 
such an agreement. 
Q. Did you ask him anything about that agreement, yourself? 
A. Yes. I asked him why American Savings wasn't signing it. 
Q. Did he respond? 
A. Yes. He said, "They didn't need to." He said, "With the 
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls 
Condominiums.8 
Q. Now, did you believe what he told you? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And did you rely on it? 
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A. I relied on it. (R.239, pp.212-4) 
That is the only interpretation of this agreement that makes any sense. 
American took advantage of that interpretation when it encouraged Margetts 
to find buyers of condominiums in the project and actually sold five 
condominiums as a result of that. (R.539, p.230) 
As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, American became Terrace 
Falls Condominiums and is still operating the project under that name. In fact, 
the Real Property Purchase Agreement between Terrace Falls and American 
(Exhibit 4, H2.B) contains an assignment of the business of selling 
condominium units and of the name "Terrace Falls" from Terrace Falls to 
American. Thus, American stepped into the shoes of Terrace Falls and took 
over the obligation to complete the project and to pay the bills incurred in 
owning and operating the project. It inherited the burdens as well as the 
benefits of the project including the obligation to credit Margetts for 20% of the 
proceeds of sales in the project. Even if the agreement is considered to have 
been made by Terrace Falls, American, as the purchaser of the project from 
Terrace Falls, with knowledge of the obligation to Margetts through its actual 
or apparent agent, is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary. 
Mullins v. Evans. 560 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1977). 
This transaction was, in fact, a bulk sale of Terrace Falls inventory of 
condominium units to American without compliance with the bulk sales 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, §§70A-6-101, et seq. That 
failure makes the buyer, American and its successor, New West, liable for any 
obligation not taken care of in the sales transaction itself. The purpose of 
-26-
those provisions is to make sure that all outstanding obligations are paid or 
provided for in the sale of the assets from which claimants would otherwise 
be paid. American and Terrace Falls did attempt to provide for the payment of 
such obligations in their Real Property Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 4, U4.E.) 
wherein they agreed to cooperate in obtaining the release of liens and 
American agreed to pay all sums required to be paid in connection with the 
obtaining of such releases. Thus, by its own contract, American agreed to 
pay what was required to obtain a release from Margetts and, further, became 
obligated to satisfy any claims of Margetts against Terrace Falls as the 
successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls and the beneficiary of the release given 
up by Margetts in return for the promise of Terrace Falls. New West has now 
stepped into the shoes of American and is likewise bound to honor the 
commitments made to Margetts. 
POINT V 
MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE 
AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS 
LIEN BY IMPROPER CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED 
FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE, NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR 
UNFAIR DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR 
DAMAGES. 
The facts recited above clearly demonstrate that Margetts was induced to 
sign the agreements and release his lien because of the representations 
made to him by Mr. Snow. He would not have done so except for those 
representations which turned out to be false. All of the elements of fraud are 
-27-
present including false, material representations made knowingly or 
recklessly, justifiable reliance, inducement and damage. Pace v. Parrish. 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). The elements of negligent misrepresentation 
are also present, including pecuniary interest in the transaction, superior 
position to know the facts, careless or negligent false representation 
expecting reliance and reasonable reliance and damage. Christenson v. 
Com. Land Title Co.. 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). Duress and coercion are 
also present. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins.. 16 U.2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). Since Margetts perception of the agreement was an 
essential element of the contract and it is unconscionable to enforce the 
contract against him without honoring what he thought he was getting, 
unilateral mistake also provides grounds for relief. John Call Engineering v. 
Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987); B & A Associates v. L A. Young 
Sons Const. Co.. 796 P.2d 692 (Utah 1990). Because Margetts gave up his 
entire interest in the project in return for what was an illusory promise, the 
agreement is unconscionable and should be rescinded or reformed. 
Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co.. Inc.. 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). 
Any one or all of these principles have application in this case and entitle 
Margetts to rescission of the transaction and reinstatement of his lien or, in the 
alternative, to damages for what he has lost as a result. What he has lost 
could just as easily be compensated by enforcement of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. In any event the judgment against him in this case cannot be 
justified in light of the unfair dealing that has occurred in this matter. 
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POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR 
RENTAL VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$17,100 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The court entered judgment against Margetts for rent for nineteen 
months based on what the court determined the fair rental value to be. This 
judgment was obviously not based on any rental agreement between 
Margetts and New West. In fact, the court found that no such agreement 
existed (R.515, 1116). The evidence fully supports this since Roulhac Garn 
did not prepare an occupancy agreement for Margetts (R.539, p.305) and 
since no one ever asked Margetts to pay any homeowners' fees or rent 
(R.539, p.235) and in fact refused his offer to pay homeowners' fees (R.539, 
p.233). How can the court conclude that Margetts owes rent without an 
agreement to pay rent? There must be a factual and legal basis for such a 
conclusion. 
The only possible legal basis for such a conclusion would be unjust 
enrichment, which requires that (1) a benefit be conferred on one person by 
another, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit, and 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 
P.2d 910 (Utah 1987); Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). There 
was no unjust enrichment in those cases even though a benefit was 
conferred on one party. In our case there are not facts to establish these 
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essential elements. The court actually found that both parties benefited from 
Margetts' occupancy (R.515, 1116). American dismissed its security personnel 
because of Margetts1 presence on the project and, in addition, several sales 
of units were made as a direct result of his presence there (R.515, TIM 8 and 
19; R.539, p.230). That represents a substantial benefit to American which 
would exceed any rental value of the unit and, in light of that, it cannot be 
concluded that it would be inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he 
may have received. The court, of course, made no such finding. Furthermore 
New West lost no revenue because of Margetts' occupancy since only three 
units in the entire project were rented out. (R.538, p. 151, 161-2) The rest of 
the complex was essentially vacant. There is no basis for unjust enrichment. 
There is no factual or legal basis for the judgment for the rental value of 
the unit and it must be reversed. 
POINT VII 
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR 
$21,600 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR 
THE LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED. 
The basis for the claim of unlawful detainer was the Notice to Quit on 
March 25, 1989. The section of the Unlawful Detainer Statute relied upon by 
New West as the basis for this claim is §78-36-3. The only provision that 
could apply to this case is §78-36-3 (1)(b)(ii) which provides: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty 
of an unlawful detainer. 
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(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite 
term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains 
in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of 
not less than five days; 
To come within this provision the tenant must have leased the property 
"for an indefinite term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved." The next 
subparagraph does not apply unless the property is leased with periodic rent 
reserved and then the tenancy is converted to a tenancy-at-will. That was not 
the case here. There was no lease and no rent of any kind reserved. New 
West's claim for rent before the Notice to Quit and of a tenancy at will after is 
inconsistent. If there was a rental arrangement before, that would first have to 
be terminated to make Margetts a tenant-at-will. Therefore, there was no 
basis for unlawful detainer. 
As stated in Perkins v. Spencer. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), 
"unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly 
complied with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it." New West 
has not complied with the requirements of §78-36-3 in order to place Margetts 
in unlawful detainer of the condominium unit. Furthermore, it has not 
complied with §78-36-6 which provides: 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail 
addressed to the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his 
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of 
suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to 
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the tenant at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found 
at the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a 
conspicuous place on the leased property. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the Notice to Quit was mailed to 
Margetts (R.538, p.177-8) but there is no evidence that it was sent by 
registered or certified mail as required by the statute. The burden of proof is 
on New West to show its total compliance with the statute. Without proof of 
service by one of the four methods allowed by the statute, the unlawful 
retainer remedy is not available to New West. Carstensen v. Hansen. 107 
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). 
There is a further reason why the judgment for unlawful detainer cannot 
be supported. The Notice to Quit in this case, if served at all, was served only 
on Margetts and not on his wife, who resided in the condominium with him 
during the alleged unlawful detainer period. Therefore, even if Margetts had 
moved from the condominium, New West would have had no right to 
possession as against his wife. It, therefore, suffered no actual damaige. In 
such a case, Perkins v. Spencer, supra at 449, held that "nominal damages to 
vindicate their right to possession against her [him in this case] is all that 
could properly be awarded." 
The severe remedy of the unlawful detainer statute requires strict 
compliance with all of its terms before judgment thereunder is appropriate. 
American Holding Co. v. Hanson. 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970); Van 
Zvverden v. Farrar. 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). New West has not 
complied and is, therefore, not entitled to a judgment for unlawful detainer. At 
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most, it would be entitled to nominal damages. The judgment for $21,600.00 
must be reversed. 
POINT VIII 
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE 
OVERTURNED BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY 
STATUTE OR AGREEMENT. 
Any award of attorney's fees must be based on either a statute or an 
agreement which authorizes such fees. Not even a stipulation will support 
such an award. Mecham v. Benson. 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979). The only 
statute involved in this case is the Unlawful Detainer Statute which provides, 
in §78-36-10(3), U.C.A., for the award of attorney's fees only "if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement." The "lease or agreement" is defined 
under §78-36-10(1) as "the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held." In this case there is no lease or agreement under which the property 
was held. New West's own attorney admitted that she prepared no 
occupancy agreement (R.539, p.305). 
New West has asserted that the Condominium Purchase Agreement 
(Exh.7, U20) provides for attorney's fees in this case. In the first place that 
agreement only provides for fees in a dispute arising "under this Agreement," 
which is not the agreement under which Margetts held the property. In the 
second place, New West did not obtain a judgment based on a claim or 
dispute under that agreement. In fact, it abandoned its claim under that 
agreement when it sought a judgment only for Margetts' occupancy of the 
property. When objection was made to evidence as to rental value because 
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of the claim to enforce the agreement, New West's attorney stated, "We are 
not seeking $134,000.00. That would amount to specific performance" 
(R.538, p. 154), thus electing to forego the claim under the purchase 
agreement and electing to pursue only a claim for occupancy. He confirmed 
this in his closing argument when he said, "the primary relief that we seek is... 
restitution or possession of the unit" (R.539, p.334) and "we have elected to 
merely--to proceed merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property" 
(R.539, p.335). Consistent with that position, the lower court only awarded 
judgment based on Margetts' occupancy of the property. 
Utah cases have held that one cannot recover attorney's fees under an 
agreement which he has rescinded. One may not "avoid the contract and, at 
the same time, claim the benefit of the provision for attorney's fees." BLT 
Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456, at 458 (Utah 1978). The 
abandonment of the claim under the agreement is an avoidance of the 
agreement. Similarly, in Cluff v. Culmer. 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976), it was 
held, at 499: 
However, this court has numerous times said that such a 
provision for attorney's fees makes them allowable only for 
enforcement of the covenants in the contract. Therefore, it does 
not extend to implied covenants or obligations not expressly 
included therein. It follows that the trial court correctly ruled that 
attorney's fees claimed by the plaintiffs are not allowable. 
Since New West was not enforcing any covenant in the purchase agreement, 
it cannot rely on the attorney's fee provision of that agreement. There is, 
therefore, no basis for the award of attorney's fees. 
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Furthermore, Guff v. Culmer. supra at 499, went on to state: 
When attorney's fees are properly awardable, they must be 
proved as any other damages: either by stipulation that the court 
may determine them from his own knowledge and experience, 
or there must be evidence upon which to base a finding as to 
their necessity and reasonableness." 
There is neither a stipulation nor evidence in this case from which a finding of 
necessity and reasonableness can be made. That is a further ground upon 
which the award of attorney's fees must be overturned. 
POINT IX 
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD 
NOT BE CALCULATED PRECISELY AND WERE FOR 
THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE. 
Prejudgment interest is allowable, according to Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins. Brown and Gunnell. 784 P.2d 475, at 483 (Utah App. 1989), only 
when the damages can be calculated with mathematical certainty 
"in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing 
the amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment".... 
On the other hand, interest cannot be allowed in cases "where 
damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province 
of the jury to assess at the time of trial" . . . . In particular, 
damages ascertained by determining the fair market value of 
real property before and after the damage "cannot be 
determined with mathematical precision [and] may be inherently 
uncertain." 
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The determination of the rental value of real property is in the same category 
since that is in the province of the trier-of-fact to be determined from the 
testimony of experts. Therefore, as in Price-Orem. supra, prejudgment 
interest cannot be awarded. That portion of the judgment, too, must be 
overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and of the guidelines 
approved by the Supreme Court to preserve the integrity of the legal system 
require that New West's attorneys be disqualified. This case arises out of the 
same transaction upon which Margetts was advised by those attorneys and 
there is an irrebuttable presumption that confidential information was 
communicated to them. The only effective way to enforce the Rules and 
guidelines is to overturn the judgment resulting from the improper 
representation in this case. 
The judgment must, nevertheless, be overturned because of errors made 
with respect to the merits of the case. The Twenty Percent Agreement cannot 
be considered separate and apart from the other agreements signed by 
Margetts. He would not have signed them without the Twenty Percent 
Agreement and it was agreed to, with the others, at the same time and as a 
part of the same transaction. It was, in fact, the incentive or inducement for 
the signing of the others. It is, therefore, required that they all be upheld, or 
rescinded, together and that Margetts' lien be reinstated or that he be given 
credit against the price of his unit for twenty percent of the proceeds of sales 
of other units. Since all of the documents constitute one transaction, Miargetts 
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is on one side of the transaction and New West and Terrace Falls stand 
together on the other side, each of them bound by the promises of the other, 
both having received and accepted the benefits of Margetts1 agreement. 
Beyond the fact that New West's predecessor and Terrace Falls were 
joint parties on the other side of the total agreement, New West is bound by 
the acts and representations of Mr. Snow who had either actual or apparent 
authority to bind its predecessor. American dealt directly with Mr. Snow, gave 
him directions, accepted advice from him, instructed him to draft the 
documents, authorized him to negotiate for it and paid his fees for all of this. 
That is actual authority and American is bound by all acts within the scope of 
that authority or the course of that employment even if it did not authorize all 
of the specific acts. It further placed Mr. Snow in a position where Margetts 
justifiably assumed he was authorized to act for it. Mr. Snow was the 
spokesman for Lee Stevens, the acknowledged representative of American, 
from the very first meeting. Mr. Snow was the only person with whom 
Margetts dealt from beginning to end. He, at least, had apparent authority to 
bind American. Furthermore, American and New West had no qualms about 
accepting the benefits of the agreement with Margetts. It received what it set 
out to obtain from Margetts and kept that with no concern that Margetts didn't 
receive what he was promised in return. That constitutes ratification and 
estops it from denying Margetts the benefit he was to receive. 
A third reason requires that New West be bound by the promises and 
representations made to Margetts. It has received from Terrace Falls a 
conveyance of the whole project, including the name "Terrace Falls" and the 
business of selling of condominium units and all other tangible and intangible 
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assets of the project. Terrace Falls is left with nothing (except a release of 
liability) and New West has everything (including liability for any obligations 
of Terrace Falls). As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, New West 
became Terrace Falls and still continues to operate as Terrace Falls 
Condominiums. It is, therefore, responsible for the obligations of Terrace 
Falls, especially those incurred in obtaining the releases required to complete 
the transfer. 
The facts of this case constitute fraud, duress, mistake, negligent 
misrepresentation, unconscionability and unfair dealing which entitle 
Margetts to rescission and return to the status quo ante or to damages for the 
loss to him. Because of this, the judgment against him must be reversed and 
a judgment entered in his favor. 
Furthermore, the judgment for rent, prejudgment interest, unlawful 
detainer and attorney's fees is not supported by the facts or the law. The 
judgment for rent has no basis in any rental agreement of any kind and the 
essential elements of unjust enrichment are not present. Both parties 
received a benefit with American receiving the greater benefit. It is, therefore, 
not inequitable that Margetts retain whatever benefit he received. The 
prejudgment interest is also not allowable since the determination of the fair 
rental value of the property is the province of the trier-of-fact from the 
testimony of expert witnesses and could not have been calculated at the time 
with mathematical certainty. The judgment for unlawful detainer must also be 
reversed because the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
have not been met. There was no lease of the property or conversion to a 
tenancy-at-will. The Notice to Quit was not served as required by the statute. 
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And, no actual damages were suffered because Margetts1 wife was entitled to 
remain in possession even if Margetts had moved from the property. No more 
than nominal damages can be awarded. Finally, the judgment for attorney's 
fees is not based on any statute, agreement, evidence, or stipulation and, 
therefore, must also be overturned. 
The entire judgment in this case should be reversed and the case 
remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Margetts either 
rescinding the transaction and reinstating his lien or awarding him ownership 
and possession of the condominium, or damages in lieu thereof, and his 
costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
-39-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief was hand-delivered on the J^Znf: day of January, 1991, to 
the following: 
W. CULLEN BATTLE and 
CRAIG T. JACOBSEN 
Fabian and Clendenin 
12th Floor, 215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
